Abolishing Anonymity on the Internet in the Light of Ludwig von Mises

A state ban on anonymity on social media can be analyzed on the basis of Ludwig von Mises’ monumental work Human Action as an intervention that restricts freedom of choice, sets aside the different needs of individuals, and confuses dealing with specific offences with universal control over the terms of taking part in public debate.

Having lived in the last century, Ludwig von Mises naturally did not write about social media. The following article is an application of the principles of his work, not an attribution to him of a position he formulated on online anonymity. It concerns a state-imposed ban, not the choice of a private service to require real names.

The wish for safety does not prove that the means is right

The starting point of Human Action is that individuals act, using means to attain ends. Whether a means is right is not proved by how desirable its end is. We need to examine whether it actually serves that end, and what other consequences it brings about.

Reducing threats, fraud, and harassment is a legitimate aim. It does not follow, however, that the mandatory identification of every user is a necessary or suitable means.

To justify such a policy, it is not enough to present examples of anonymous offenders. One must examine what changes for everyone: for the offenders, for the victims, for the other users, and for the businesses that provide the services.

That a possibility is abused does not, by itself, prove that abolishing it altogether serves social cooperation.

Disclosing one’s identity has a different cost for each person

In Mises’ analysis, value is tied to the choices and valuations of acting individuals. We cannot assume that an obligation burdens everyone equally because it has the same legal wording.

For a public commentator who is already recognisable, appearing under his real name may change almost nothing. For an employee reporting an employer’s practices, a victim of abuse, or a citizen criticizing powerful local or other interests, it may change everything.

Anonymity, or the use of a stable pseudonym, allows these people to separate their participation in a discussion from the public exposure of their civil identity. The ban removes this option.

The result is not necessarily more responsible speech. It may be less speech — and, indeed, less lawful and socially useful speech. The formal possibility of publishing remains, but the personal price may become prohibitive.

Identification to the platform alone is less exposing than displaying one’s name publicly, but it is not without cost: it requires trust in the body that manages the link between identity and activity.

So a reduction in offensive comments, even if achieved, is not enough as an overall balance sheet. One must also count the complaints, the testimonies, and the discussions that did not take place because of the new obligation.

Freedom requires room for different institutional choices

In chapter XV, section 6, Mises examines freedom within social cooperation and its relation to state coercion (https://mises.org/library/book/human-action). Applied here, the crucial question is who decides the terms of participation.

Different services can offer different combinations of privacy and verification. A professional network may require real names. A support community may consider pseudonymity indispensable. Another service may offer voluntary verification.

The Misesian defense of private property does not imply that all platforms must host anonymous users. It does imply, however, a strong argument for allowing different choices, instead of the state imposing a single model.

A universal ban does not let users choose greater privacy at its corresponding cost; it decides in advance that this option must not be offered.

Identity is no substitute for trustworthiness

Social cooperation does not rest solely on knowing the other person’s full name. It also rests on experience, reputation, and the assessment of conduct.

A stable pseudonym can build up a record of trustworthiness. Its holder may have reason to protect that reputation. Conversely, a user under his own name may lie or make threats.

This does not mean that identification is never useful. It means that we must distinguish confirming identity from confirming truth and from preventing offences.

A universal real-name requirement does not remove this distinction. It merely imposes one particular mechanism of trust at the expense of others.

Responsibility for acts, not mandatory identification as a general condition

Mises does not advocate abolishing the state or tolerating violence and fraud. In Human Action, the protection of peaceful social cooperation is an essential function of the state’s apparatus of coercion.

Hence the Misesian defense of anonymity is not a defense of impunity. The argument is that investigating specific offences and universal preventive identification are different policies.

It is true that a lack of information can make an investigation harder. The defense of anonymity must acknowledge this cost. But the other side must also acknowledge that easier law enforcement is not the only criterion of a free society.

Human Action cannot give us empirical rates of effectiveness for a modern regulation. It does, however, oblige us not to treat the restriction of freedom as a costless means.

The consistent conclusion is therefore this: the state should deal with specific unlawful acts without abolishing — in the absence of adequate comparative evidence — the possibility of lawful anonymous or pseudonymous participation. Freedom of choice and the differentiation of services allow different needs to coexist. A universal ban subordinates them to a single administrative answer.

Anonymity does not guarantee responsible behavior. Abolishing it, however, takes a useful option away from everyone in order to deal with its abuse by some. That is exactly the step that needs justification — and it is not justified merely by invoking safety.

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